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IV. ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND COST SHIFTING:
WHO FOOTS THE BILL?*
A. Introduction
Has the general rule recuiring each party to pay for its own
production costs in discovery kept up with the times? The amount
of data stored electronically has made it possible for litigants to
discover relevant information that would have been unimaginable in
the past. E-mail conveys information that, traditionally, would have
been orally communicated.2 Moreover, documents that were once
shredded and destroyed remain available in electronic form.
3
Additionally, information about the date and time a document is
produced is now automatically created every time a document is
saved.4
* Sonia Salinas, Loyola Law School, Juris Doctorate Candidate, Spring
2006. I thank Professor Georgene Vairo and Heather Barber for their
thoughtful insight and direction and the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
editors and staff for their help in the preparation of this piece. Special thanks
to my family and friends for their unending encouragement and support.
1. See, e.g., Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 360-64
(1978) (holding that the party responding to a discovery request, plaintiffs in a
class action, must pay costs of identifying members of a class); Daewoo Elecs.
Co. v. United States, 650 F. Supp. 1003, 1006-07 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986)
(holding that where producing party benefited from technology, party will bear
costs of producing e-discovery). See generally Eric Van Buskirk, Raging
Debate: Who Should Pay for Digital Discovery?, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 27, 2003 at T4
(discussing reformation of the producer pays rule).
2. See David K. Isom, Electronic Discovery: New Power, New Risks,
UTAH B.J., Nov. 2003, at 8 (noting that information available in electronic
form has greatly increased); Electronic Discovery Request, Potomac
Consulting Group (describing the various types of information available
including e-mail messages, word processing files, spreadsheets, address book
information, Internet use histories and downloaded files), at http://www.
potomac.con/stories/Electronic DiscoveryRequests.htm (last visited Aug. 5,
2005). See generally infra Part III (describing the scope of e-discovery and
methods of production).
3. See sources cited supra note 2.
4. See id.
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Along with the increased use of e-mail and computers, the cost
of discovery has skyrocketed. 5 When a party requests a "document,"
this may include not only the paper copy of the document, but also
various versions saved on a network or hard drive.6 Modem-day
discovery may also include demands for deleted e-mail, word
processing files, and information that have only existed in electronic
form. 7 The cost of producing this "electronic discovery,'8 can be
astronomical in some cases. 9 Due to the protests of burdened parties
and legal scholars, the established "producer pays" rule has come
into question.
Critics of this general rule argue that parties use the exorbitant
costs of producing electronic documents and information as a tool to
frustrate cases into settlement.' 0 In this way, an e-discovery request
can be used as economic leverage. In many cases, it may be more
cost effective for a party to settle the matter rather than spend money
on searching for electronic data, extracting those data, reviewing
them for privileged information, and paying lawyers to try the case."1
5. See Rebecca Levy-Sachs & Richard K. Traub, What Do You Know
About E-Discovery?, at http://www.dri.org/dri/pastarticleshidden.cfm (last
visited Feb. 12, 2005); Van Buskirk, supra note 1. But see Mary Hayes & Paul
Travis, E-Discovery Eases the Paper Chase (noting that electronic discovery
costs are decreasing with the advent of new technology),
http://www.informationweek.com/shared/printableArticleSrc.jhtml?articlelD=
6502957 (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
6. Digital Discovery Making Gains, but Costs Remain High, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 25, 2004, http://www.discoveryresources.org/04_
costsharingarticles.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
7. See generally infra Part III.A (describing the breadth of discoverable
electronic documents).
8. "Electronic discovery" refers to data requested that is in electronic
form. This article refers to electronic discovery as "e-discovery" throughout.
9. See, e.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., No. 02 C 6832, 2004 WL
1895122, at *6 (N.D. 11. Aug. 10, 2004) (noting that a small portion of the e-
discovery request would cost several hundred thousand dollars); Medtronic
Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, No. 01-2373-M1V, 2003 U.S. LEXIS
8587, at *24-*28 (W.D. Tenn. May 13, 2003) (suggesting that e-discovery
costs would range into the millions); Van Buskirk, supra note 1.
10. Leigh Jones, The Surging Evolution of E-Discovery: The Cost and
Scale of E-Discovery Spawns New Firms, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 2, 2004, at 1; see
Jerold S. Solovy & Robert L. Byman, There Ought to Be a Law, NAT'L L.J.,
Jan. 27, 2003, at B6.
11. See Solovy & Byman, supra note 10.
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This practical reality flies in the face of the broad discovery rules,
which are in place to ensure fair conflict resolution.' 2 Judge Shira
Scheindlin of the Southern District of New York, a leader in the e-
discovery discourse, has commented on how e-discovery is changing
the resolution of cases. She observed, "in the end, [electronic]
'discovery is not just about uncovering the truth, but also about how
much of the truth the parties can afford to disinter.""
3
The critic's cries have not fallen on deaf ears. Several judicial
decisions have evaluated the circumstances under which the
requesting party should bear some, or all, of the financial burden of
e-discovery. 14  Furthermore, proposed amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) attempt to address e-discovery
controversies, including who bears the cost.' 5 Part B of this Article
12. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34 (1984); see also
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958) (noting that
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make a civil trial "less a game of
blindman's buff [sic] and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts
disclosed to the fullest practicable extent"); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,
501 (1947) (noting that with the Rules, "civil trials in the federal courts no
longer need be carried on in the dark"); Isom, supra note 2 ("Broad discovery
is the cornerstone of our litigation process' in this country." (quoting Jones v.
Goord, No. 95 Civ. 8026, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8707, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May
16, 2002))).
13. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(quoting Rowe Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421,
423 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), affid 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
14. See id. at 318-23 (holding that a court should only consider cost
shifting when electronic data is relatively inaccessible and modifiying the
Rowe factors because they "favored" cost shifting); OpenTV v. Liberate
Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474, 477-79 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (applying the Zubulake
factors to determine whether e-discovery costs should be shifted); Xpedior
Creditor Trust v. Credit Suisse First Boston, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 459, 465-67
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying Zubulake factors for the same); Rowe Entm 't, Inc.,
53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d at 296 (adopting a balancing approach consisting of eight
factors to determine whether discovery costs should be shifted).
15. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY
COMMITTEE (2004) [hereinafter PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND
COMMITTEE NOTES], http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment2005/CVAug04.
pdf. There is a seven-step process to amending the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: (1) initial consideration by the Advisory Committee; (2) publication
of proposed amendments and public comment; (3) consideration of the public
comments and final submission of the amendments to the Standing Committee;
(4) approval by the Standing Committee; (5) Judicial Conference approval; (6)
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explores leading court decisions evaluating cost shifting' 6 and
determining when it should apply. Also in Part B, this Article
surveys which, if any, of these approaches to cost shifting courts
have followed and how those approaches differ. Part C discusses the
ambiguities and concerns in cost shifting analyses, including the
policies behind certain case law trends and the efficiency of current
approaches. Finally, Part D examines proposed amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that deal with e-discovery cost
shifting.
B. The Cost Shifting Analysis and Recent Cases:
The Road to Zubulake
Cost shifting is an exception to the established discovery rule
that the responding party' pays its own production costs. 1
Discussion of the current cost shifting analysis and case law requires
some understanding of the evolution of the doctrine. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure have shaped the current approach to this
practical problem. In particular, the judiciary has developed cost
shifting analysis through three landmark cases: McPeek,19 Rowe,20
and Zubulake.21 These cases have had a great impact on e-discovery
jurisprudence nationwide.
1. Cost Shifting and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not explicitly state that
courts have the authority to shift discovery costs. The Supreme
Court, however, has recognized that courts can exercise their
"discretion under Rule 26(c) to grant orders protecting [a party] from
Supreme Court approval; and (7) Congressional review. Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts, The Rulemaking Process (2004), at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/proceduresum.htm. The current amendment
process will be complete in late 2005. See id.
16. This article uses the term "cost shifting" throughout this article to refer
to the allocation of production costs to the requesting party.
17. This article uses the terms "responding party" and "producing party"
interchangeably to refer to the party producing discovery.
18. See supra note 1.
19. McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001).
20. Rowe Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d
(West) 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
21. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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'undue burden and expense' in [complying with discovery requests],
including orders conditioning discovery on the requesting party's
payment of the costs of discovery."22  Also, notes to the 1970
Amendments to Rule 34 state that the judiciary has power to protect
respondents from undue burden or expense by restricting discovery
or requiring that the discovering party pay costs.2 3 Thus, though not
expressly stated, Rules 26(c) and the 1970 amendments to Rule 34
provide the courts with authority to shift discovery costs.
Rules 26(c) and 37(a) also dictate when courts will consider cost
shifting. Typically, the producing party asks a court to cost shift
while seeking a protective order to alleviate a burdensome discovery
request under Rule 26(c).24 Also, the issue can be joined when the
requesting party moves to compel under Rule 37(a), and the
producing party resists the motion.25 Thus, these rules provide the
vehicle through which the cost shifting question comes into play.
The Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) proportionality test has driven the most
recent cost shifting decisions.26 This test allows a court to alter the
scope of discovery "if the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit ... ."27 This balancing
"take[s] into account the needs of the case, the amount in
controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at
stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery
22. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978).
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 34 advisory committee's note.
24. See, e.g., Xpedior Creditor Trust v. Credit Suisse First Boston, Inc., 309
F. Supp. 2d 459, 465-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Rowe Entm 't, Inc., 53 Fed. R. Serv.
3d at 298; Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 460, 464 (D. Utah 1985).
25. See, e.g., Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp., 222
F.R.D. 594 (E.D. Wis. 2004); Portis v. City of Chicago, No. 02 C 3139, 2004
WL 1535854 (N.D. Il. July 7, 2004); Cognex Corp. v. Electro Scientific
Indus., Inc., No. Civ.A. O1CV10287RCL, 2002 WL 32309413 (D. Mass. July
2, 2002); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 52 Fed. R. Serv. 3d
(West) 168 (E.D. La. 2002); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs & Antitrust
Litig., Nos. 94 C 987, MDL 997, 1995 WL 360526 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995);
Haworth, Inc. v. Herman Miller, Inc., No. 1:92 CV 877, 1995 WL 465838
(W.D. Mich. Apr. 20, 1995).
26. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Rowe Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West)
296 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001).
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(iii).
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in resolving the issues."
28
The FRCP play a principal role in the cost shifting analysis.
Rules 26(c) and the 1970 amendments to Rule 34 provide the basis
for the judiciary's discretion to shift discovery costs from the
producing party to the requesting party.29 Rule 26(c) and Rule 37(a)
motions provide the introduction to the cost shifting analysis.
3 0
Additionally, the Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) proportionality test has been the
basis for the most influential cost shifting decisions. 31  Despite
criticism from some legal scholars who suggest that the FRCP do not
provide enough guidance in the cost shifting determination, the
FRCP are clearly entrenched in the cost shifting case law.
32
2. The Evolution of Cost Shifting Case Law
In early e-discovery cases, courts were reluctant to stray from
the traditional "producer pays" rule.33 Some courts reasoned that
where the costs of e-discovery were relatively small, the producer
should continue to bear the costs. 34 Other courts reasoned that where
a company chooses to benefit from technology, that company should
bear the costs of searching through said technology. 35 Only recent
28. Id.
29. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
30. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
31. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
32. For a discussion of the proposed amendments to the FRCP, see infra
Part IV.D.
33. The traditional rule is that each party bears the costs of its own
discovery production. See sources cited supra note 1.
34. See, e.g., Mackey v. IBP, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 186, 199 (D. Kan. 1996)
(holding that "[i]n most instances, [producing discovery] will entail some
burden" and requiring the producing party to bear the costs of e-discovery);
Haworth, Inc. v. Herman Miller, Inc., No. 1:92 CV 877, 1995 WL 465838
(W.D. Mich. Apr. 20, 1995) (noting that the costs and burden involved in
producing e-discovery was miniscule in comparison to the amount in
controversy and holding that the producing party should bear the costs); Bills
v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 460, 464 (D. Utah 1985) (holding that
because the expense of the discovery production was not excessive and the
"burden in obtaining the data would be substantially greater to the requesting
party," the costs should not be shifted to the requesting party).
35. Daewoo Elecs. Co. v. United States, 650 F. Supp. 1003 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1986) (holding that if a party employs technology that produces electronic
evidence, in most cases, it will have to bear the cost associated with searching
for and producing that evidence); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs &
1644
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cases have seriously considered cost shifting for e-discovery.
a. McPeek v. Ashcroft
The court in McPeek v. Ashcroft,36 a landmark case in e-
discovery cost shifting, reconsidered the rationale behind the
traditional "producer pays" rule and provided a careful analysis of e-
discovery issues in light of the problems cost shifting seeks to
address. The McPeek court rejected the rationale that the producing
party's "choice" to use computers in its normal course of business
justified requiring the party to pay for the production of discovery.
37
In modem times, producing parties hardly have a "choice" to employ
computers in the course of business and thus should not be penalized
for not using "quill pens." 38 Further, the court in McPeek recognized
the traditional rationale encouraged the requesting party to be overly
broad in its discovery requests.
39
The McPeek court also considered the "market" approach,
which requires the requesting party to pay for the production of the
e-discovery it requests. 40 The court reasoned this approach would
guarantee discovery requests would be narrowly tailored.4' It posited
that narrowly tailored discovery requests would likely reduce costs,
and that the requesting party would receive the e-discovery it paid
Antitrust Litig., No. 94 C 987, MDL 997, 1995 WL 360526, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
June 15, 1995) (reasoning that if the producing party benefited from
technology, it cannot then use that technology as a shield in litigation and
noting that "if a party chooses an electronic storage method, the necessity for a
retrieval program... is an ordinary and foreseeable risk"); see also Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., Civ. A. No. 88-9752, 1991 WL
111040, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 1991) (holding that the established law of
liberal discovery does not penalize the requesting party for the producing
party's "unwieldly [computerized] record-keeping system" by shifting the cost
to the requesting party).
36. 202 F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001).
37. Id. at 33-34.
38. Id. at 33.
39. Id. at 33-34 ( "American lawyers engaged in discovery have never been
accused of asking for too little .... [T]hey hope that if they ask for what they
want, they will get what they need... . [T]hey hardly need any more
encouragement to demand as much as they can from their opponent.").
40. Id. at 34.
41. Id.
1645Summer 2005]
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for. The court noted, however, that this market approach would
require the requesting party to pay for e-discovery in situations
where it would not pay for paper discovery.
43
The McPeek decision described a second approach to
e-discovery: the "marginal utility" approach. The basic tenet of this
approach is that "[t]he more likely it is that [e-discovery] contains
information that is relevant to a claim or defense, the fairer it is that
the [producing party] search at its own expense. ' 44 The court noted
that even if courts required requesting parties to show the e-
discovery sought contained relevant information, the expense of
producing e-discovery would likely "beat [the producing party] into
settlement.
' 45
McPeek propelled the cost shifting analysis forward. Previously
courts had not often strayed from the traditional "producer pays" rule
when addressing e-discovery issues.46 Although the "market" and
"marginal utility" approaches have not gained national acceptance,
they have been cited47 and followed in some jurisdictions.48
b. Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc.
Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc.49 built
upon McPeek by incorporating the "marginal utility" approach and
making the cost shifting analysis a more fact-intensive balancing
test.50 Specifically, the court in Rowe used the Rule 26(b)(2)(iii)





46. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
47. E.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., No. 02 C 6832, 2004 WL
1895122 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2004); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216
F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Byers v. Ill. State Police, No. 99 C 8105, 2002
WL 1264004 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2002).
48. E.g., Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp., 222 F.R.D.
594 (E.D. Wis. 2004); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, No. 01-2373-
M1V, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 8587 (W.D. Tenn. May 13, 2003); Byers v. I11. State
Police, No. 99 C 8105, 2002 WL 1264004 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2002).




was appropriate in the cost shifting analysis. 51 The court also used
the proportionality test to derive the factors it would consider in the
cost shifting determination: (1) specificity of the discovery request,
(2) likelihood of a successful search, (3) availability of information
from other sources, (4) purposes of retention, (5) benefit to the
parties, (6) total costs, (7) ability and incentive to control costs, and
(8) parties' resources.
5 2
The Rowe court also gave some guidance as to how to weigh
each factor. For example, regarding the "specificity of the request"
factor, the court indicated that the more specific the discovery
demand, the more appropriate it is to leave the costs to the producing
party.53 As to the "likelihood of a successful search" factor, the court
used the McPeek "marginal utility" approach. 54 It reasoned that the
more likely relevant information will be found, the fairer it is for the
responding party to bear the costs. 55 Application of the "availability
from other sources" factor is fairly straightforward: this factor favors
cost shifting where the producing party has provided equivalent
information, or if it is accessible in a different format at less
expense.56  In considering the "purposes of retention," the Rowe
court found that if a party maintains information for current business
purposes, then it may be expected to bear the costs of producing that
information.
57
The Rowe court analyzed the "benefits to the parties" factor
from the point of view of the producing party. 58 If the producing
party itself benefits from the information, there is less reason to shift
51. Id. at 300 ("Although there are no firm rules, courts may take into
account, 'the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties'
resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the
importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues."' (quoting FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(iii))).
52. Id. at 303-10.
53. Id. at 303.
54. Id. at 303-06.
55. Id. at 303; see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
56. Rowe Entm't, Inc., 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d at 306.
57. Id. In contrast, if a party has the information for emergency situations
or "simply because it has neglected to discard it," it may not be required to
bear the costs. Id.
58. Id. at 307.
Summer 2005] 1647
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:1639
the costs of producing e-discovery to the requesting party.59 Under
the "total costs" factor, if the total cost of the requested discovery is
not substantial, there is no need to deviate from the presumption that
the responding party will bear the expense.60  The "ability and
incentive to control costs" factor encourages requesting parties to
narrowly tailor their discovery requests. 6 1 It may be more efficient to
place the burden on the requesting party because it controls how
expansive discovery will be.62  The "parties' resources" factor
becomes significant when one party is more financially capable of
paying for the production costs of e-discovery. 63 Yet, the relative
financial strength of the parties may be a neutral factor when each
party has sufficient resources to conduct discovery.
64
Courts deciding cases involving shifting of e-discovery costs
have widely discussed and cited the Rowe factors. 65  Rowe is a
59. Id.
60. Id. at 308-09. For a discussion of the controversy involving what the
term "costs" refers to and whether all "costs" can be shifted, see infra Part
IV.C.1.
61. See Rowe Entm't, Inc., 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d at 309 (noting that
requesting parties are better suited to decide whether further searches are
justified).
62. Id.
63. See id. at 310.
64. Id.; see also Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, No. 01-
2373-M1V, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 8587, at *29 (W.D. Tenn. May 13, 2003)
(finding that the relative financial strength factor was neutral where neither
party adduced persuasive evidence of their inability to bear the costs of
discovery and both parties had expended significant resources for legal
services in the case); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 52 Fed. R.
Serv. 3d (West) 168, 177 (E.D. La. 2002) (holding that all parties had
sufficient resources to bear the costs of litigation and thus the factor was
neutral).
65. E.g., Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp., 222 F.R.D.
594 (E.D. Wis. 2004); Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., No. 02 C 6832,
2004 WL 1895122 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2004); Thompson v. United States Dep't
of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93 (D. Md. 2003); Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Computer Assocs. Int'l v.
Quest Software, Inc., 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 401 (N.D. Ill. 2003);
Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 2003 U.S. LEXIS 8587, at *3; Byers v. Ill.
State Police, No. 99 C 8105, 2002 WL 1264004 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2002); see
also Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 652 (D. Minn.
2002) (citing Rowe to show electronic documents are discoverable); In re
Bristol-Meyers Squibb Sec. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 437, 443 (D.N.J. 2002)
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significant case in that it, along with McPeek, rejected a bright-line
test for cost shifting determinations. Further, Rowe established that
such determinations are fact-intensive rather than policy-driven.
c. Zubulake v. USB Warburg LLC
In Zubulake v. USB Warburg LLC,66 the court revisited the
Rowe balancing test. The Zubulake decision made some changes to
the Rowe factors and clarified apparent inconsistencies between
Rowe and Supreme Court precedent. 67 Further, Zubulake described
when courts should consider cost shifting and outlined the steps
relevant to an e-discovery cost shifting analysis.
68
The Zubulake court emphasized that not all e-discovery cases
require courts to consider cost shifting. The court stated that "[m]any
courts have automatically assumed that an undue burden or expense
may arise simply because electronic evidence is involved., 69 The
court, however, rejected this assumption, recognizing that in many
cases, searching for electronic evidence is easier and less expensive
than paper discovery.
70
The Zubulake court found that cost shifting analysis should only
occur when the expense of producing e-discovery is unduly
burdensome. 71  The court stated that "whether production of
documents is unduly burdensome or expensive turns primarily on
whether [documents are] kept in an accessible or inaccessible
format."7 2 To guide this analysis, the court identified five categories
(referring counsel to Rowe's "comprehensive" discussion of cost shifting);
Cognex Corp. v. Electro Scientific Indus., No. Civ.A. O1CV10287RCL, 2002
WL 32309413, at *3 (D. Mass. July 2, 2002) (citing Rowe for the proposition
that cost shifting orders may be appropriate in certain circumstances).
66. 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
67. Id. The inconsistencies arose from Rowe's preference for cost shifting
and the Supreme Court's mandate in Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437
U.S. 340, 358 (1978), that the producing party must presumptively bear
production costs. Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 320.
68. 217 F.R.D. at 324.
69. Id. at 318.
70. Id. (suggesting that electronic evidence may be cheaper to produce
because it can be searched, collected, and reviewed automatically, thus
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of data: (1) active, online data, (2) near-line data, (3) offline
storage/archives, (4) back-up tapes, and (5) erased, fragmented or
damaged data.73 The Zubulake court found the first three categories
were typically "accessible" data, and the last two were "inaccessible"
data. 74  In effect, the court created a threshold question for cost
shifting in e-discovery: are the data accessible? If so, then cost
shifting should be disregarded. If not, then cost shifting should be
considered.75
Finding the Rowe factors inadequate, the Zubulake court
modified the Rowe approach to make the cost shifting analysis more
complete.7 6  For example, the Zubulake court decided that the
amount in controversy and the importance of the issues being
litigated were necessary factors in the cost shifting analysis, factors
that were not considered in Rowe. 77 Also, the Rowe analysis gave
equal weight to all factors where the Zubulake court held that certain
78factors were more important. Further, the court in Zubulake
determined that courts applying the Rowe factors failed to develop a
full factual record. 79 Finally, the Zubulake court found the Rowe
analysis favored cost shifting, contrary to the presumption that the
producing party should bear the cost of discovery.
80
Zubulake established the following seven factors to be weighed
in the cost shifting determination: (1) the extent to which the
73. Id. at 318-19.
74. Id. at 318-20.
75. See id. at 318; see also Kenneth J. Withers, Electronic Discovery
Disputes: Decisional Guidance, Civ. ACTION (Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts)
Summer 2004, at 4, 6 (examining different forms of electronic documents and
whether they are accessible). But see Laura E. Ellsworth & Robert Pass, Cost
Shifting in Electronic Discovery, 5 SEDONA CONF. J. 125, 140-41 (2004)
(explaining that Zubulake does not create a strict threshold question but instead
simply states that a cost shifting and proportionality analysis is not appropriate
under Rule 26(b)(2) because "accessible" data is normally not expensive to
recover).
76. Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 320-21.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 321, 323 (noting that courts applying Rowe factors base their
analysis on whether relevant information would be found and that such
information rarely exists before the requested production).
80. Id. at 320 (noting that the Rowe factors were weighed equally and thus
favored cost shifting over the traditional "producer pays" presumption).
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discovery request is specifically tailored to ascertain relevant
information; (2) the availability of information from other sources;
(3) the total cost of production, compared to the amount in
controversy; (4) the total costs of production, compared to the
resources available to each party; (5) the relative ability of each party
to control costs and its incentive to do so; (6) the importance of the
issues at stake in the litigation; and (7) the relative benefits to the
parties of obtaining the information sought.81
Zubulake's first factor combines Rowe factors one and two,
which comprised the marginal utility theory introduced by McPeek.
82
The third Zubulake factor modified the sixth Rowe factor by taking
into account the total cost of production and the amount in
controversy, while Rowe only considered the costs.83 Finally, the
sixth Zubulake factor was not addressed at all in Rowe. The
Zubulake court explained that "if a case has the potential for broad
public impact, then public policy weighs heavily in favor of
permitting extensive discovery."
84
The modifications to the Rowe factors at first appear to be
minimal. They are, however, considerable because the deciding
court must take into account more information in determining cost
shifting under Zubulake. This broader inquiry could significantly
alter the outcome of many cost shifting decisions.
In addition to modifying the content of the Rowe factors, the
Zubulake decision modified the weight each factor receives.
85
According to the Zubulake court, the factors should not have equal
weight. 86 The first two factors are the most important, while factors
three, four, and five address cost issues and are of secondary
importance in the analysis.87 Factor six will rarely be significant, but
has the potential to impact those cases where public policy is at
81. Id. at 321-23.
82. See id. (citing McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001),
which described the "marginal utility" theory as a balance between the
likelihood that the back-up tape contains information and the fairness of
forcing the responding party to search at its own expense).
83. Id. at 321.
84. Id.
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stake.88 The last factor is the least significant because discovery
requests will generally favor the requesting party.
89
Zubulake broke the cost shifting analysis into three steps:
1. The court must examine the responding party's computer
system to determine whether data are accessible, and
consider cost shifting only when electronic data are
inaccessible.
90
2. The responding party must restore and produce
responsive documents from a small sample of the requested
back-up tapes so the court has some factual basis on which
to rest its determination.
9 1
3. The court must apply the seven-factor test based on the
sample supplied by the responding party.
92
These steps are fact-intensive and require that the parties and the
court develop a comprehensive record. 93 The sampling method used
by Zubulake,94 and previously by McPeek,95 established the factual
record necessary for the analysis.
96
In conclusion, the Zubulake decision gave some guidance as to
when courts should consider cost shifting in e-discovery. 97  It
provided a three-step analysis to help courts tackle the seemingly
untenable task of managing e-discovery and cost shifting.98
Zubulake also maintained the presumption that the producer pays for








94. Id. The Zubulake sampling method "require[s] the responding party to
restore and produce responsive documents for a small sample of backup
tapes." Id.
95. Id. at 323 (citing McPeek's use of a sampling method or "test run" to
establish a factual record).
96. Id.
97. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
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3. The Effect of McPeek, Rowe, and Zubulake:
The Evolution Continues
The Supreme Court's holding in Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v.
Sanders'00 is the only binding precedent involving e-discovery and
cost shifting. While McPeek, Rowe, and Zubulake have provided
insight into the e-discovery cost shifting analysis, none of these
decisions are binding on any other court. 1° 1  Courts across the
country, however, have widely discussed, cited, and in some cases,
followed these cases and their reasoning. 102 Several courts have used
these decisions as the basis for their cost shifting analysis, but either
incorporated new factors, 10
3 departed from the original reasoning,104
or combined all three decisions without determining which approach
the court would follow in what instance. 10
5
a. Applications ofMcPeek
McPeek was decided in the District of Columbia.10 6 In addition
to the D.C. District Court, two other district courts in the First and
Eighth Circuits have followed, at least partially, the McPeek
100. 437 U.S. 340 (1978) (holding that the party responding to the discovery
request must pay costs).
101. All three cases are district court cases and are thus merely persuasive
authority. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 324
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Rowe Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 53 Fed.
R. Serv. 3d (West) 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31
(D.D.C. 2001); see also Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, No. 01-
2373-M1V, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 8587, at *18-*19 (W.D. Tenn. May 13, 2003)
(relying on Rowe but noting that "Rowe Entertainment is not the final word,
nor even the definitive word, on [the cost shifting] issue").
102. See infra Part IV.B.3.
103. See Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., No. 02 C 6832, 2004 WL
1895122, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2004) (following Zubulake but adding its
own factor to the analysis).
104. See Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 2003 U.S. LEXIS 8587, at *18-
*23 (applying Rowe but departing from the Rowe reasoning in one factor and
applying McPeek instead).
105. See Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp., 222 F.R.D.
594, 602-03 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (discussing McPeek, Rowe, and Zubulake and
then applying both Zubulake and McPeek); Thompson v. United States Dep't
of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93 (D. Md. 2003) (discussing McPeek,
Rowe, and Zubulake, and declining to apply any of them to the case).
106. McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001).
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reasoning. 107 Further, courts reference McPeek often in discussions
of Rowe and Zubulake, as both cases incorporated McPeek's
"marginal utility" theory.' 08
In Cognex Corp. v. Electro Scientific Indus.,'0 9 the District
Court of Massachusetts, which sits in the First Circuit, found that of
the case law relied on by the parties in their briefs, McPeek was the
most analogous to the case at bar. "10 The dispute in Cognex involved
the searching of back-up tapes with partially deleted or inaccessible
information. 1 The court, relying on McPeek, held that case law did
not establish a general duty to search back-up tapes.
112
The court then considered whether discovery of relevant data
was likely."13  McPeek's marginal utility theory addresses the
likelihood of obtaining relevant information from the search and
reasoned that if the search is unlikely to yield relevant results, it
should be paid for by the requesting party."14 In Cognex, the court
used the marginal utility theory to reach a different result. The court
held that the search would likely not yield relevant results as the
"most relevant emails [were] to be deleted at the time." '115 The court
did not shift costs as had the court in McPeek, but it did not compel
the producing party to search its back-up tapes either. 1
6
Even though the requesting party in Cognex offered to pay for
the extraction of the inaccessible information, the court did not shift
107. See Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645 (D. Minn.
2002); Cognex Corp. v. Electro Scientific Indus., Inc., No. Civ.A.
01CV10287RCL, 2002 WL 32309413 (D. Mass. July 2, 2002).
108. See, e.g., Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc., 222 F.R.D. at 602 (E.D. Wis. 2004)
(finding that the first two Zubulake factors "mirror the marginal utility test
found in McPeek"); Wiginton 2004 WL 1895122, at *5 (noting that the first
two factors in Zubulake comprise McPeek's marginal utility test); Medtronic
Sofamor Danek, Inc., 2003 U.S. LEXIS 8587, at *18-*24 (applying the Rowe
factors but discussing McPeek's marginal utility theory).
109. No. Civ.A. O1CV10287RCL, 2002 WL 32309413, at *4 (D. Mass. July
2, 2002).
110. Id.
111. Id. at *2.
112. Id. at *5.
113. Id.
114. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
115. Cognex, 2002 WL 32309413, at *5.
116. Id.
1654
costs. 117 The court found there was "something inconsistent with our
notions of fairness to allow one party to obtain a heightened level of
discovery because it is willing to pay for it."'1 18 The court in Cognex
relied on the marginal utility theory to protect the producing party,
but not by shifting costs. Rather, the court denied discovery
altogether. 1
In Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 20 the District Court
of Minnesota in the Eighth Circuit, relying on McPeek, among other
cases, reasoned that since relevant information could be found from
the search of the producing party's computer system, the information
was discoverable.' 21 This court noted that it was not conducting a
cost shifting analysis, as the requesting party offered to pay for the
extraction of the electronic information. 122  The court, however,
seemed to allow the requesting party to pay for the search because
the likelihood of discovering relevant information was low, but not
non-existent, and the requesting party was willing to pay for it. 
123
The two cases discussed above seem to follow McPeek to some
degree, but they do not scrupulously adhere to McPeek. They
mention McPeek, reference the marginal utility analysis, and even
touch on the problems with the market approach that McPeek
addressed. 124  The limited reliance on McPeek does not diminish
McPeek's importance, however. The McPeek analysis has been
incorporated into the Rowe and Zubulake tests, and thus courts tend
to apply McPeek as part of the Rowe and Zubulake analysis.
125
117. Id.
118. Id. at *5.
119. Id. (reasoning that a sense of fairness dictates that those with "deeper
pockets" should not have a strategic advantage in litigation). Arguably, under
McPeek the costs would be shifted, as the less likely the search is to yield
relevant results, the fairer it would be to shift the production costs to the
requesting party. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
120. 210 F.R.D. 645 (D. Minn. 2002).
121. Id. at 651.
122. Id. at 652 n.6.
123. See id.
124. See Cognex, 2002 WL 32309413, at *5 (noting that McPeek was
analogous to the case at bar and discussing the marginal utility test); Antioch,
210 F.R.D. 645 (discussing the market approach introduced in McPeek and its
problems).
125. See supra note 108.
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b. Applications of Rowe
Rowe was decided in the Southern District of New York, and
while that court subsequently modified Rowe in Zubulake, Rowe has
nonetheless made an impact nationally. 126  District courts in the
Fourth and Sixth Circuits have followed the Rowe reasoning. 127 Of
course, since no appellate level court has yet considered cost shifting
for e-discovery, no binding precedent constrains district courts, many
of which have taken liberties in their applications of the Rowe
analysis. 1
28
In Murphy Oil USA v. Fluor Daniel, Inc.,129 the Eastern District
of Louisiana, which sits in the Fourth Circuit, applied the Rowe
factors to a cost shifting request stemming from a motion to compel
in a breach of contract dispute. 130 The court found that of the eight
Rowe factors, five weighed in favor of shifting the cost to the
requesting party. 13 Two of the factors weighed against cost shifting,
and one factor was neutral. 132  Based on this analysis, the court
shifted the costs of production to the requesting party. 133 The court,
however, only shifted to the requesting party the costs involved with
production, and did not shift the costs involved with reviewing the
data for privileged information. 134
126. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
127. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, No. 01-2373-M1V, 2003
U.S. LEXIS 8587 (W.D. Tenn. May 13, 2003); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor
Daniel, Inc., Inc., 52 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 168 (E.D. La. 2002).
128. See supra notes 101-107 and accompanying text; see also Medtronic
SofamorDanek, Inc., 2003 U.S. LEXIS 8587, at *18-*19 (noting that Rowe is
not binding precedent and departing from the Rowe reasoning).
129. 52 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 168 (E.D. La. 2002). This case applied the
Rowe factors. It obtained the factors, however, from the original January 16,
2002 order from U.S. Magistrate Judge Francis in the Rowe case and not the
May 9, 2002 review of that order by Judge Patterson, which is the opinion
referred to throughout this article as Rowe. See id. at 173 (citing Rowe Entm't,
Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 8272, 2002 WL 63190
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2002)).
130. Id. at 170.
131. Id. at 177.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 178. For a discussion of various approaches to privilege review
costs and whether courts deem them legitimate costs relevant to cost shifting
see infra Part IV.C. 1.
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In Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson,135 the Western
District of Tennessee, sitting in the Sixth Circuit, applied the Rowe
factors to a cost shifting request stemming from a motion to compel
in a trade secret dispute.' 36 The court did not stray from the Rowe
analysis except in its discussion of the "[p]urpose for [m]aintaining
the [d]ata" factor.' 37 This court disagreed with the Rowe court's
reasoning that cost shifting was warranted where a party did not
search its back-up tapes for information in the course of its
business. 138 This court reasoned that "Rowe Entertainment is not the
final word, nor even the definitive word on the issue."' 139 The court
instead applied the McPeek marginal utility test to this factor,
concluding that because the requesting party had not made a showing
that there would be relevant information on the back-up tapes, the
factor weighed toward cost shifting.140 The court found five of the
eight Rowe factors warranted cost shifting in that case. 
141
Murphy Oil and Medtronic exemplify the two extremes of how
courts apply the Rowe factors. 142 The Murphy Oil decision did not
depart from the Rowe court's application of the factors.' 43 While the
Medtronic court claimed to be applying Rowe, it expressly departed
from the Rowe reasoning and stated that Rowe was not binding. 144 It
is clear courts recognize Rowe as an important decision with useful
insight into the cost shifting analysis. Courts also realize, however,
this area of the law is being developed piecemeal and each case can
be decided largely through the discretion of the sitting judge.
135. No. 01-2373-M1V, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 8587 (W.D. Tenn. May 13,
2003).
136. Id.
137. Id. at* 18.
138. Id.; see also Rowe Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 53 Fed.
R. Serv. 3d (West) 296, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing Rowe Entm't, 2002 WL
63190, at *10 ("Just as a party would not be required to sort through its trash to
resurrect discarded paper documents, so it should not be obligated to pay the
costs of retrieving deleted e-mails.").
139. Medtronic SofamorDanek, Inc., 2003 U.S. LEXIS 8587, at *18-*19.
140. Id. at *19-*23.
141. Id. at *29.
142. This can also be said about the way courts apply McPeek and Zubulake.
143. See Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., Inc., 52 Fed. R. Serv.
3d (West) 168 (E.D. La. 2002).
144. See Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, No. 01-2373-M1V,
2003 U.S. LEXIS 8587 (W.D. Tenn. May 13, 2003).
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c. Applications ofZubulake
District courts nationwide have embraced the Zubulake decision
slightly more readily than they have McPeek or Rowe. 145 Some of
these courts, however, have also applied Zubulake very liberally,
much like the application of McPeek and Rowe. 146  Some have
applied the Zubulake factors in tandem with one of the other cases, 
147
and others have also departed from or added to Zubulake to make the
cost shifting determination. 1
48
The court in Xpedior Creditor Trust v. Credit Suisse First
Boston, Inc., 14 9 however, meticulously applied the Zubulake factors
in a case involving a class action breach of contract suit between a
class of corporations and an investment banker who sought a
protective order from producing electronic data and requesting cost
shifting. 150 The Xpedior court determined that the data in question
were inaccessible, and thus a cost shifting analysis was
appropriate. 151 Further, the court noted that it would weigh the
145. More courts have applied the Zubulake factors than McPeek and Rowe,
and more courts have held that Zubulake would apply in cost shifting
determinations. E.g., Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp.,
222 F.R.D. 594 (E.D. Wis. 2004); Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., No. 02
C 6832, 2004 WL 1895122 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2004); Multitech. Servs. v.
Verizon S.W., No. Civ.A. 4:02-CV-702-Y, 2004 WL 1553480 (N.D. Tex. July
12, 2004); Xpedior Creditor Trust v. Credit Suisse First Boston, Inc., 309 F.
Supp. 2d. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); OpenTV v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474
(N.D. Cal. 2003).
146. See supra notes 103-105, 109-123, 128, 135-144 and accompanying
text; infra note 148.
147. E.g., Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp., 222 F.R.D.
594 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (applying Zubulake factors after discussing McPeek and
Rowe and relying on McPeek for some portion of the analysis).
148. E.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., No. 02 C 6832, 2004 WL
1895122 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2004) (applying Zubulake but adding an eighth
factor that the court determined was necessary for a fair resolution of the case
at bar); Multitech. Servs. v. Verizon S.W., No. Civ.A. 4:02-CV-702-Y, 2004
WL 1553480 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2004) (applying Zubulake but failing to
discuss all the Zubulake factors). But see Xpedior Creditor Trust v. Credit
Suisse First Boston, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying the
Zubulake factors scrupulously, as the case was decided by Judge Scheindlin,
who was also the author of the Zubulake decision).
149. 309 F. Supp. 2d. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 465.
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factors as the Zubulake opinion instructed.' 52 The court determined
cost shifting was not appropriate, as the first four factors weighed
against cost shifting and the remaining factors were neutral.153 Judge
Scheindlin, who decided this case, also decided Zubulake, which
may explain why it was an exact application of the prior case.1
54
Unlike Xpedior, OpenTV v. Liberate Technologies5 5 did not
adhere closely to the Zubulake factors or the three-step analysis.
156
In the Northern District of California, the OpenTV court found a cost
shifting analysis was warranted because the data requested were very
costly to retrieve, even though the data were not inaccessible.
157
Further, the OpenTV court did not weigh the factors as Zubulake
instructed. Instead, the court determined that the first two factors
plus two others158 weighed against cost shifting, while one factor was
neutral and two weighed in favor of cost shifting. 159 According to
Zubulake, the first two factors should carry the most influence in the
determination. 160  The court determined that cost shifting was
appropriate, however, "because the parties [were] similarly situated"
and split the costs of producing the electronic data between the
parties. 16 1 Clearly, this court was giving greater weight to factor
four, the cost of production, as opposed to the resources of the
parties, which according to Zubulake was of secondary
importance.' 
62
In Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc.,16 3 a class action suit
alleging nationwide sexual harassment, an Illinois district court
carefully reviewed McPeek, Rowe, and Zubulake before deciding to
152. Id. at 465 n.6.
153. Id. at 467.
154. See id. at 459; Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
155. 219 F.R.D. 474 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
156. See id.
157. See id. at 477.
158. Id. at 479 (holding that factor three, the total cost of production
compared to the amount in controversy, and factor five, the relative ability of
each party to control costs, weighed against cost shifting).
159. Id.
160. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
161. OpenTV,219F.R.D.at 479.
162. Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 323.
163. No. 02 C 6832, 2004 WL 1895122 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2004).
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apply the Zubulake factors, plus an additional factor determined by
the court.164 The additional factor was "the importance of the
requested discovery in resolving the issues at stake in the
litigation."' 65 While this factor seems almost identical to Zubulake
factor one (the extent to which the request is specifically tailored to
discover relevant information), the Zubulake factor arguably focuses
on the specificity of the request rather than the information being
sought. Despite adding a factor, the court weighed all factors as
described in Zubulake and made it a point to maintain the
presumption that the producing party pays for discovery. 166 The
court held that cost shifting was warranted and the requesting party
should bear twenty-five percent of the discovery costs.
The adherence to Zubulake was even less structured in
Multitechnology Services v. Verizon Southwest,168 a case decided in
the Northern District of Texas. 169 The court did not limit the cost
shifting analysis to inaccessible data, as Zubulake instructed, opting
instead to read Zubulake as not "interfer[ing] with the court's
authority to enter any appropriate protective order in the discovery
process.. . 170 Further, the court considered only five of the seven
Zubulake factors and made no mention of the weight accorded to
each. 171 Of the factors discussed, only one of them weighed in favor
of cost shifting.' 72 Of the remaining four, three weighed against cost
shifting. 173  The court mentioned the final factor but did not
determine whether it weighed for or against cost shifting.' 74 The
court ultimately determined the cost of the e-discovery should be
164. Id. at *4.
165. Id.
166. Id. at *4, *8.
167. Id.
168. No. Civ.A. 4:02-CV-702-Y, 2004 WL 1553480 (N.D. Tex. July 12,
2004).
169. Id.
1,70. Id. at *1.
171. See id. at *2 (failing to discuss Zubulake factors four and six).
172. Id. (explaining that Zubulake factors one, two, and five weighed against
cost shifting, mentioning factor three with no determination of whether it
weighed in favor or against cost shifting, and holding that factor seven




split evenly between the parties.1
75
While Zubulake has been more widely accepted than McPeek
and Rowe, it is by no means meticulously followed. 176 The Zubulake
opinion identified the complex issues involved in the cost shifting
determination and, along with its predecessors, formed the
framework of the e-discovery cost shifting analysis.177 Like McPeek
and Rowe, however, Zubulake seems to be the springboard from
which individual courts jump to their own conclusions.
C. Ambiguities and Concerns in the Cost Shifting Analyses
Although the cost shifting approaches discussed above have
been widely commended, they have not been immune from
criticism. 17  While these cost shifting analyses have provided
significant guidance in the cost shifting determination, they have not
satisfactorily answered all questions. This section addresses the
ambiguities and concerns in the cost shifting analyses, including: the
confusion regarding what costs should be shifted; the concern that
the threshold question in Zubulake may be too extreme; the role of
the sampling method employed by McPeek and Zubulake; the
175. Id.
176. See supra notes 146, 155-175 and accompanying text.
177. See MERRICK T. ROSSEIN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND
LITIGATION § 14:29.10 (2004) (praising the Zubulake decision as a thoughtful
analysis of some of the complex issues concerning the use of e-discovery).
178. See, e.g., id.; Joan E. Feldman et al., Computer Forensics, Inc., Show
Me The Money: Cost Concerns in Computer Discovery, (explaining that
McPeek was a sensible approach to cost shifting issues),
http://www.forensics.com/pdf/ShowMe the Money.pdf (last visited Aug. 5,
2005); Robert Douglas Brownstone, Collaborative Navigation of the Stormy E-
Discovery Seas, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 53 (2004) (crediting the Zubulake
decision with developing a sound, pragmatic, and cost sensitive approach to e-
discovery), available at http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/V1O:5/article53.pdf. But
see Bahar Shariati, Note, Zubulake v. UBS Warburg: Evidence that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Provide the Means for Determining Cost
Allocation in Electronic Discovery Disputes?, 49 VILL. L. REv. 393, 427-28
(2004) (criticizing Zubulake for confusing the application of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure with the application of its "vague hierarchy" of importance
in balancing factors); Patrick J. Burke & John G. Siegal, Managing Electronic
Records in the E-Discovery Challenge, N.Y. L.J. TECHTRENDS, Sept. 15, 2003,
at T6 (speculating that making inaccessible data a pre-requisite for a cost
shifting analysis would encourage corporations to store their data inaccessibly,
thus driving up cost and burdening requesting parties).
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method courts use to determine how much of the costs should be
shifted; and whether courts employ the cost shifting option when
discovery requests should be denied.
1. What Costs Are Shifted?: Privilege Review
and Other Miscellaneous Expenses
E-discovery involves many expenses, not all of which courts
consider in the cost shifting analysis. In particular, courts have
determined that the costs of reviewing data for privileged
information, responsiveness to the discovery request, as well as
preserving electronic data for litigation purposes are not production
costs and thus are not included in the cost shifting determination.1
79
With few exceptions, the production costs of electronic data
constitute the only issue in the cost shifting analysis.1
8 0
Privilege review costs are the most hotly debated.18 ' The time,
effort, and money expended to search exorbitant amounts of data for
responsive and privileged information is just as likely to bully a party
into settlement as the costs of production.' 8 2  Courts have
overwhelmingly held, however, that privilege review costs are not
179. See, e.g, Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., No. 02 C 6832, 2004 WL
1895122 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2004) (holding that the costs of data review for
privileged information and for responsiveness would not be shifted to the
requesting party); Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Quest Software, Inc., 56 Fed. R.
Serv. 3d (West) 401 (N.D. I11. 2003) (holding that costs litigated in the case
were not for production of electronic data, but for reviewing data for privilege,
costs which are not eligible to be shifted); OpenTV v. Liberate Techs., 219
F.R.D. 474 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that costs of privilege review would be
borne solely by the producing party); Byers v. Ill. State Police, No. 99 C 8105,
2002 WL 1264004 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2002) (holding that the producing party
should bear the costs of privilege review and responsiveness review, despite
finding that the cost of producing electronic data should shift to the requesting
party).
180. See, e.g., Chimie v. PPG Indus., 218 F.R.D. 416, 422 (D. Del. 2003)
(noting that because privilege review in this case was such a "daunting task" as
it spanned twenty years of data, cost shifting may be considered); In re Gen.
Instrument Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 96 C 1129, 1999 WL 1072507, at *6 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 18, 1999) (noting that the costs of privilege review should be
considered in any calculus of whether to allow discovery).
181. See supra note 179 and accompanying text (describing several cases
where, in addition to production costs, privilege review costs were at issue).
182. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text (discussing how
production costs can be used as a tool to frustrate cases into settlement).
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costs that can be shifted to the producing party.1
8 3
While most courts have decided not to consider the costs for
privilege review in the cost shifting analysis, few courts have
actually discussed their reasoning for not doing so. 184 The court in
Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc.185 reasoned that that the
responding party's choice to retain privileged or confidential
information in electronic form without designating the data to
specific files is analogous to a situation where "a company fails to
shred its confidential paper documents and instead leaves them
intermingled with non-confidential discoverable papers."' 86  The
court continued that the producing party should bear the costs
resulting from such a choice.187 This reasoning is convincing, as the
party asserting the privilege should not be able to force the
requesting party to bear an expense for review that exclusively
benefits the opponent. Such a rule would allow producing parties to
assert privilege as a tool to frustrate cases into settlement.
183. See cases cited supra note 179.
184. See, e.g, Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (holding that although initial costs in retrieving and restoring
information may be shifted, the responding party should bear the cost of
reviewing data once it has been restored to an accessible form); Computer
Assocs. Int'l v. Quest Software, Inc., 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 401 (N.D. Ill.
2003) (holding that privilege review costs are borne by the producing party,
but offering no analysis as to why); Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v.
Michelson, No. 01-2373-M1V, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 8587 (W.D. Tenn. May 13,
2003) (holding that privilege review costs are generally borne by the
responding party, but withholding analysis because parties in the case had
come to an agreement as to privilege review costs); Byers v. 11. State Police,
No. 99 C 8105, 2002 WL 1264004, at *12 (N.D. 11. June 3, 2002) (holding
that each party should bear their own expenses associated with privilege
review, but not citing support or reasoning for that decision).
185. No. Civ.A. 99-3564, 2002 WL 246439 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2002).
186. Id. at *7.
187. Id.
188. The fear that requesting parties would frustrate cases into settlement
with broad e-discovery requests mentioned in Part A of this Article was
addressed by the McPeek, Rowe, and Zubulake courts, which all require
specific and relevant discovery requests. See Digital Discovery Making Gains,
But Costs Remain High, supra note 6 (quoting Judge Francis, author of the
Rowe opinion, "If the parties are on a fishing expedition, they should have to
pay for the fishing party."). Similarly, the fear that the producing parties will
abuse the assertion of privilege review to prolong and frustrate litigation is
addressed by the current cases holding that producing parties should bear the
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Privilege review costs, responsiveness review costs, and data
preservation costs are borne by the producing parties in the paper
discovery realm. 189 Further, it makes sense to have the producing
party bear the costs of review and preservation because the
producing party is in the best position to control these costs. 190 Not
only do the producing parties control the costs of review and
preservation, but these costs also differ from production costs
because the producing party is the sole beneficiary of privilege
review and preservation. 191 Thus, in addition to it being unjust to
have the requesting party bear costs for the express purpose of
benefiting the opposing party, such a practice would encourage
abuses that would frustrate the fair resolution of cases.1
92
2. The Zubulake Threshold:
A Barrier to Legitimate Cost Shifting Requests?
Zubulake's creation of a threshold question (whether the data
sought are accessible or inaccessible) has been the basis for some
discussion. 193 This question is based on the premise that if the data
are accessible, then they will not be expensive to retrieve, and thus
cost shifting is not warranted. 194 Some have argued this threshold
does not remove all discretion from the courts, however, and that it
privilege review costs. See supra note 179.
189. See Zubulake, 216 F.R.D. at 290.
190. See id. (noting that the producing party decides which person conducts
the privilege review and which protocol is employed and thus controls the
costs of the review).
191. The producing party benefits from the privilege review, as it is the party
asserting the privilege. The producing party benefits from the responsiveness
review because it prefers to give the opposing party the minimum amount of
information. The producing party benefits from data preservation to avoid
spoliation sanctions.
192. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
193. See e.g., Burke & Siegal, supra note 178 (speculating that making
inaccessible data a pre-requisite for a cost shifting analysis would encourage
corporations to store their data inaccessibly, thus driving up cost and burdening
requesting parties); Ellsworth & Pass, supra note 75, at 140 (explaining that
Zubulake does not create a strict threshold question, but instead simply states
that a cost shifting and proportionality analysis is not appropriate under Rule
26(b)(2) because "accessible" data is normally not expensive to recover).




serves merely as a guide to help the court weed out frivolous cost
shifting requests. 195
In Multitechnology Services v. Verizon Southwest, 96 discussed
above, the court did not limit the cost shifting analysis to inaccessible
data when applying Zubulake.197 The court read Zubulake as not
"interfer[ing] with the court's authority to enter any appropriate
protective order in the discovery process."' 98 While the Zubulake
language was absolute, 199 it is not binding, and courts are free to
interpret the threshold question only as a guide to whether the cost
shifting analysis should occur.
200
Despite Zubulake not being binding, however, some could argue
the threshold question may narrow the number of cases in which
courts employ the cost shifting analysis. Narrow application of the
analysis is consistent with the liberal policy underlying civil
discovery and is therefore desirable. 201 The accessible/inaccessible
data distinction not only reduces the likelihood that an inappropriate
cost shifting request will be granted,20 2 but also preserves the
195. See Multitech. Servs. v. Verizon S.W., No. Civ.A. 4:02-CV-702-Y,
2004 WL 1553480 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2004); Ellsworth & Pass, supra note
75, at 140-41.
196. No. Civ.A. 4:02-CV-702-Y, 2004 WL 1553480 (N.D. Tex. July 12,
2004).
197. Id. at *1.
198. Id.
199. See Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 324 ("A court should consider cost shifting
only when electronic data is relatively inaccessible.").
200. See supra notes 101, 193 and accompanying text.
201. If courts were to contemplate cost shifting in every e-discovery request,
they would raise a barrier to discovery and cut against the liberal discovery
policies. Liberal discovery is favored and employed in civil matters to
encourage resolution of conflicts by reaching the truth and deciding cases on
their merits. See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34 (1984);
Shlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114 (1964) (noting that the FRCP 26-37
should be accorded a broad and liberal treatment to ensure that civil trials in
federal courts no longer need be carried on in the dark); Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495 (1947) (recognizing the "liberal atmosphere" surrounding the
federal discovery rules); Todd D. Robichaud, Old Wine in New Bottles:
Discovery Disputes and Cost Shifting in the Digital Age, BRIEF, Winter 2004,
at 56, 57 (noting that the discovery contemplated by the FRCP is broad and
liberal).
202. Courts generally employ cost shifting to protect the producing party
from undue burden. If the data is relatively accessible, then the burden on the
producing party will likely not be undue, and thus cost shifting would be
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presumption that the producing party should bear the production
costs unless the burden is undue.2 0 3 Cost shifting is a tool used by
courts to protect producing parties from undue burden, not an
entitlement from which every producing party should benefit.
204
3. Sampling Method: Essential to the
Fact-Intensive Cost Shifting Analysis
The sampling method was intended to aid the court in gathering
the information necessary to properly conduct a cost shifting
analysis. 20 5 While the Zubulake court held that the responding party
must restore and produce responsive documents from a small sample
of the requested data to give the court some facts on which to base its
determination, 206 some could argue that this sample is not the only
way to gather such facts.207  Nonetheless, the sampling method
accurately estimates the costs of producing the data and the
2020
likelihood that relevant information will be found.2°
In Hagemeyer North America v. Gateway Data Sciences, 209 the
inappropriate.
203. By employing cost shifting only when the producing party shows that
the burden involved in production is undue, the presumption that the producing
party pays for the costs of production is preserved. The producing party can
prove that the burden is undue much more easily when the date is inaccessible.
204. See Robichaud, supra note 201, at 57 (noting that courts can protect
parties by precluding or limiting discovery when the discovery involves
"undue burden or expense" and that the court may order the costs and expenses
of producing the information sought be shifted to the requesting party).
205. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 324 (S.D.N.Y.
2003). The court in McPeek also employed the sampling method to gather
facts for its analysis. See McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001).
206. See Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 324.
207. See, e.g, Multitech. Servs. v. Verizon S.W., No. Civ.A. 4:02-CV-702-Y,
2004 WL 1553480 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2004) (applying the Zubulake factors
without ordering a sample of the data be restored); Thompson v. United States
Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93 (D. Md. 2003) (holding that a
factual record is necessary for the cost shifting determination and asking for
particularized facts from the parties, however, not ordering restoration of a
sample of the data).
208. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 282-83
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting the exact length of time required for restoration
services, the hourly fee, and the number of relevant e-mails restored is
information that the court and parties were able to use in extrapolating the total
costs of production and the likelihood that relevant e-mails would be located).
209. No. 97-C-635, 2004 WL 1810273 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 12, 2004).
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court followed the Zubulake and McPeek reasoning regarding
sampling and required the producing party "to restore a sample of
backup tapes and... to make additional submissions addressing
whether the burden or expense of satisfying the entire request is
proportionate to the likely benefit."210 The Hag'emeyer court noted
that the cost shifting analysis was fact-intensive. 11 It also noted cost
shifting should only occur when the burden or expense on the
producing party is undue.
212
Although an estimate of the facts needed for the cost shifting
analysis may be acceptable to some courts,213 it is not as precise as a
sample. Further, producing parties may be encouraged to
overestimate their costs and underestimate the relevant data to be
found in order to shift costs to the requesting parties. The sampling
method not only produces accurate factual information that leads to
appropriate cost shifting determinations, but also reduces the
likelihood that producing parties will be tempted to misrepresent
their burden.
4. Allocation of Costs: The Guessing Game
The cost shifting analysis is guided by McPeek, Rowe, and
214Zubulake. Even when courts determine that cost shifting should
occur, however, it is unclear (and unpredictable) how they will
divide costs.2 15 The cost shifting cases do not offer much guidance
as to what amount of the costs should be shifted.216
210. Id. at *9.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
214. See infra Part IV.B.2.
215. See, e.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., No. 02 C 6832, 2004 WL
1895122, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2004) (declaring without explanation that
the requesting party should bear seventy-five percent of the production costs);
Multitech. Servs. v. Verizon Southwest, No. Civ.A. 4:02-CV-702-Y, 2004 WL
1553480, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2004) ("requiring the parties to evenly
shoulder the expense" of producing the data but relying only on balancing the
parties' interests); OpenTV v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474 (N.D. Cal.
2003) (splitting the costs of the data extraction evenly between the parties but
giving no indication of what reasoning was used to determine the cost
allocation).
216. See cases cited supra note 215.
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In OpenTV v. Liberate Technologies,217 the court split the costs
between the parties after determining cost shifting was
appropriate. 218 The OpenTV court found that "because the parties
[were] similarly situated" cost shifting was warranted. 219 Thus, the
court gave the greatest weight to factor four, the cost of production
as opposed to the resources of the parties,220 which, according to
Zubulake, was of secondary importance. 22 1 Other than the court's
reference to the parties' resources, the court gave no indication as to
what reasoning it used to split the production costs evenly between
the parties. 222
In Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc.,223 the court held that
although cost shifting was appropriate, the requesting party should
only bear seventy-five percent of the production costs.224 In order to
preserve the presumption that the producing party should bear the
costs of production, the court reasoned that the responding party
should pay for the remaining twenty-five percent of the costs.225 The
Wiginton court allocated production costs with no mention of the
method employed to reach the seventy-five percent/twenty-five
percent allotment.226
Zubulake did not discuss how to divide the costs when cost
shifting was deemed appropriate. 227  The court in its progeny
Zubulake 111228 stated, however, that "[i]t is beyond cavil that the
precise allocation is a matter of judgment and fairness rather than a
mathematical consequence of the seven factors... Nonetheless, the
217. 219 F.R.D. 474 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
218. Id. at 478.
219. Id.
220. See id.
221. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 323 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
222. See OpenTV, 219 F.R.D. at 478.
223. No. 02 C 6832, 2004 WL 1895122 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2004).
224. Id. at *8.
225. Id.
226. See id.
227. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 323 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
228. 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Discussed in Part IV.B.2.c.,
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), was the
first of five opinions involving the same case and parties.
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analysis of those factors does inform the exercise of discretion.,
229
The Zubulake III court noted that the share of the costs to be shifted
should not be so "costly [that] it [would] chill the rights of litigants
to pursue meritorious claims." 230 Thus, Zubulake IX1 explained there
is no calculus to cost allocation and parties in cost shifting disputes
are at the mercy of the courts.3
5. Are Courts Shifting Costs
When They Should be Denying Requests?
Some critics have argued courts are too eager to allow cost
shifting in situations where the discovery request should be
denied.232  Cost shifting is just one tool courts have to protect
producing parties from "undue burden" as allowed by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 233 Critics argue courts are increasingly
turning to cost shifting when it would be fair to deny the discovery
request altogether.
2 34
In Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc.,235 the court opted to
shift production costs to the requesting party, noting that the
requesting party was willing to pay for such costs. 236 The court
seemed to allow the requesting party to pay for the search even
229. Zubulake, 216 F.R.D. at 289.
230. Id.
231. See id.
232. Ellsworth & Pass, supra note 75, at 140-41 (noting that turning to cost
shifting when prohibiting discovery would be appropriate hurts the litigation
process by imposing costs on the judiciary and delaying the resolution of
cases).
233. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2), (c); see also Ellsworth & Pass, supra note
75, at 140-41 (noting that cost shifting is a possible remedy only after undue
burden is found under Rule 26(b)(2)); Jonathan M. Redgrave & Erica J.
Bachmann, Ripples on the Shores of Zubulake: Practice Considerations from
Recent Electronic Discovery Decisions, FED. LAW., Nov.-Dec. 2003, at 30,
31-33 (explaining that cost shifting is only one option held by courts when
dealing with e-discovery and that under Rule 26(c), courts could deny
discovery requests, limit discovery including designation of time or place,
decide on discovery methods different than one proposed by either party, limit
scope of discovery, limit persons involved, limit discovery to exclude trade
secrets, etc.).
234. See Ellsworth & Pass, supra note 75, at 140-41; Redgrave &
Bachmann, supra note 233, at 31-33.
235. 210 F.R.D. 645 (D. Minn. 2002).
236. Id. at 652 n.6.
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though the likelihood of discovering relevant information was low,
but not non-existent, because the requesting party was willing to pay
for it.237 This case arguably presented a situation where the court
should have denied the discovery request rather than shift the
production costs to the requesting party.
In Cognex Corp. v. Electro Scientific Industries238 the requesting
party was also willing to bear the costs of their discovery request.
239
The court found that there was "something inconsistent with our
notions of fairness to allow one party to obtain a heightened level of
discovery because it is willing to pay for it."240 Instead of allowing
the cost shifting to occur, the court denied the discovery requests.
241
Whether courts deny discovery requests or shift production costs
to the requesting party, the court has achieved the goal of Rule 26(c),
protecting the producing party from undue burden or expense.
242
Further, by turning to cost shifting rather than denying requests,
courts further the FRCP policy of allowing matters to be litigated and
decided on their merits. 243 While there is some concern about costs
to the judiciary,244 liberal discovery encourages parties to settle cases
out of court, which lessens the time and monetary expense to the
court system.
237. See id.
238. No. Civ.A. 01CV10287RCL, 2002 WL 32309413, at *4 (D. Mass. July
2, 2002).
239. Id.
240. Id. at *5.
241. Id.
242. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); Redgrave & Bachmann, supra note 233, at
31-33.
243. See, e.g., Shlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1964) (noting
that FRCP 26-37 should "be accorded a broad and liberal treatment to
effectuate their purpose that civil trials in the federal courts no longer need be
carried on in the dark"); see also Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20,
34 (1984) ("Liberal discovery is provided for the... purpose of assisting the
preparation and trial, or settlement of litigated disputes."); Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495, 505 (1947) (recognizing the "liberal atmosphere" surrounding
the federal discovery rules); Robichaud, supra note 201, at 57 (noting that the
discovery contemplated by the FRCP is broad and liberal).
244. See Ellsworth & Pass, supra note 75, at 140-41 (noting that turning to
cost shifting when the prohibition of discovery would be appropriate hurts the




D. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and Their Effect on the Cost Shifting Analysis
The proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure seek to address the perceived inadequacies of the current
rules in the realm of e-discovery. 2 45 The amendments address five
areas related to e-discovery.246  This section will discuss those
amendments that have a direct impact on costs and cost shifting
issues.
1. Proposed Amendment to Rule 26(f): Codifying the Obvious
The proposed amendment to Rule 26(f), the meet and confer
provision, seeks to have litigating parties "address during their
conference any issues relating to the disclosure or discovery of
electronically stored information, including the form of production,
and also to discuss issues relating to the preservation of
electronically stored information and other information that may be
sought during discovery." 247 This amendment focuses on the early
identification of problems involving e-discovery. 248  Although the
amendment does not focus on costs or cost shifting, it does have an
impact upon the expenses borne by the court and the parties by
avoiding delays and identifying e-discovery related conflicts between
the parties.249
245. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND COMMITTEE NOTES, supra note 15;




246. See Request for Comment, supra note 245, at 5 (stating that the five
topics the proposed amendments address are: "[1] early attention to issues
relating to [e-discovery] ...; [2] discovery of electronically stored information
that is not reasonably accessible; [3] the assertion of privilege after production;
[4] the application of Rules 33 and 34 to electronically stored information; and
[5] a limit on sanctions under Rule 37 for the loss of electronically stored
information.").
247. Id. at 6.
248. Gregory P. Joseph, Electronic Discovery I, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 4, 2004, at
12 (noting that the amendment encompasses important subjects and that the
amendment reminds counsel and judges that these subjects should be
considered at the inception of litigation).
249. See id. at app. 17-18 (noting that discussion of e-discovery conflicts
will prove useful, even if unresolved, as parties will then be informed of the
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The amendment to Rule 26(f) is modest.250 It does not affect
traditional paper discovery251 and does not obligate parties to reach
any agreements in regards to e-discovery conflicts; rather, the
amendment merely requires that the issues be discussed.252 Thus,
some have posited that the amendment to Rule 26(f) is benign and
only codifies what is already in practice.
253
2. Proposed Amendment to Rule 34(b): The Form in Which
Electronically Stored Information is to be Produced
The proposed amendment to Rule 34(b) allows the requesting
party to indicate in which form it would prefer the electronic data to
be produced. It also allows the producing party to object to the form
requested, and provides that absent a request or court order regarding
the form of production, the producing party may produce the data in
the "form in which it is ordinarily maintained, or in an electronically
searchable form." 254  Allowing requesting parties to specify the
"desired form may facilitate the orderly, efficient, and cost effective
discovery of electronically stored information." 255  The costs of
issues opposing parties face and will know how to proceed early on).
250. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND COMMITTEE NOTES, supra note 15,
at app. 22; see also Ken Withers, Two Tiers and a Safe Harbor: Federal
Rulemakers Grapple with E-Discovery, FED. LAW., Sept. 2004, at 29, 31-32
(noting that not all cases will be affected by the amendments, as only cases
involving e-discovery will be bound to the new amendments); Shira A.
Scheindlin, Outside Counsel: Electronic Discovery Takes Center Stage, N.Y.
L.J., Sept. 13, 2004, at 4 (noting that the proposed amendments only affect
parties that have e-discovery issues).
251. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND COMMITTEE NOTES, supra note 15,
at app. 18 (noting that even if no agreement is reached, the discussion of e-
discovery issues will be helpful).
252. See id.
253. See, e.g., James E. Rooks Jr., Will E-Discovery Get Squeezed?, TRIAL,
Nov. 2004, at 18 (noting that the amendments other than the three discussed in
his article are "benign, albeit unnecessary"); Todd L. Krause & Brian D.
Coggio, Electronic Discover: Where We Are, and Where We're Headed, 16 J.
PROPRIETARY RTS. 16, 18 (2004) (noting that the current practice in most
jurisdictions is to confer with opposing counsel and attempt to agree upon
electronic discovery matters and that the proposed amendments to Rule 26(f)
are meant to encourage this early discussion of e-discovery issues).
254. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND COMMITTEE NOTES, supra note 15, at
16, app. 27 (proposed amendment to Rule 34(b)); Request for Comment, supra
note 245.
255. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND COMMITTEE NOTES, supra note 15, at
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litigating the form in which data will be produced and the costs of
producing data in more than one form will be restricted to limited
cases.
256
This amendment seeks to bring e-discovery in line with
traditional paper discovery, where the form of production is limited
217by the FRCP. The amendment limits the form in which parties
can produce data, as "there are infinite choices of form for
production. ' 258 Yet the proposed amendment does not explain what
a "searchable" format is.259 Without clarification as to whether the
proposed amendment requires production in a word-searchable
format, a searchable database, or an index, litigation over the form of
e-discovery production may continue.
260
3. Proposed Amendment to Rule 26(b)(2):
Establishing a Two-Tier Approach to E-Discovery
The proposed amendment to Rule 26(b)(2) reads:
A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored
information that the party identifies as not reasonably
accessible. On motion by the requesting party, the
responding party must show that the information is not
app. 30.
256. See id. at app. 31; see also Krause & Coggio, supra note 253, at 19
(discussing the costs involved with the form electronic data is produced in and
when courts require producing parties to produce in both electronic and hard-
copy form); Withers, supra note 250, at 34 (noting that the proposed
amendment to Rule 34(b) will limit the requesting party's ability to litigate the
form of the data if it did not specify the form of production in the initial
request).
257. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND COMMITTEE NOTES, supra note 15,
at app. 30-31 (explaining that although the option of an electronically
searchable form is "not precisely the same as the option to produce hard-copy
materials organized and labeled to correspond to the requests, it should be
functionally analogous"); see also Withers, supra note 250, at 34 (explaining
that in the paper discovery realm, responding parties can produce the
information as it is kept in the normal course of business or in response to the
form specified in the discovery request and that the Rule 34(b) amendment
gives e-discovery producers "two default options that are roughly analogous to
the options they now have for producing paper documents").
258. Withers, supra note 250, at 34.
259. Scheindlin, supra note 250, at 32.
260. See id.
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reasonably accessible. If that showing is made, the court
may order discovery of the information for good cause and
may specify terms and conditions for such discovery.
261
The proposed amendment was drafted to limit the type of electronic
data that is discoverable to that which is reasonably accessible.262 It
allows for producing parties to self-designate their data as
inaccessible. 263 It also permits producing parties not to produce such
data unless compelled by the courts.264 This part will explain the
two-tiered approach to e-discovery that the proposed amendment
creates, the presumptions that are created by this amendment, the
potential for abuses, and the proposed amendment's effects on the
current cost shifting analysis.
a. The two tiers
The first tier presumptively requires that the producing party
"produce those electronic records that are relevant and reasonably
accessible [which is] defined as that which is routinely maintained by
the [producing] party in the usual course of its regular activities."
265
Critics argue the first tier invites abuse by allowing producing parties
to self-designate their data as inaccessible.266  While producing
parties may self-designate, however, upon a motion to compel from
the requesting party the producing party must demonstrate to the
court that the requested material is inaccessible. 267 This process may
delay discovery of accessible data, and thus increase costs to the
parties. Yet it will not prohibit the discovery of those data.
The second tier created by the proposed amendment allows for
the production of relevant inaccessible data upon a showing of good
cause from the requesting party.268  "The good-cause analysis
261. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND COMMITTEE NOTES, supra note 15, at
app. 6.
262. See id. at app. 11.
263. See id.
264. See id. at app. 11-12.
265. Scheindlin, supra note 250, at 32.
266. See Rooks, supra note 253, at 22 (arguing that allowing producing
parties to determine what electronic information is not accessible will invite
more "stonewalling than requesting parties already encounter").
267. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND COMMITTEE NOTES, supra note 15,
at app. 11; Scheindlin, supra note 250, at 32.
268. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND COMMITrEE NOTES, supra note 15,
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balances the requesting party's need for the information against the
burden on the [producing] party."269  Courts would apply this
balancing test by looking to Rule 26(b)(2)(i),(ii), and (iii) to
determine whether the effort involved in retrieving the information
sought is warranted.27 °
b. New presumptions and burdens
The proposed amendment changes the basic presumption upon
which courts have based discovery decisions: that is, all relevant data
are discoverable unless an undue burden to the producing party can
be shown. 271 In the realm of electronically stored information, the
alternative presumption is that only accessible data, as characterized
by the producing party, are discoverable. 272 The requesting party can
overcome the presumption that the producing party's designation is
correct by moving to compel discovery. 2 7  Only then will the
producing party have to prove its information is inaccessible.
2 7 4
Another presumption created by the proposed amendment is that
once a court deems the data inaccessible, those data are not
at app. 11-12; see also Scheindlin, supra note 250, at 32 (discussing whether
information is "reasonably accessible").
269. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND COMMITTEE NOTES, supra note 15, at
app. 11.
270. Id. at 11-12. The committee notes recognize that courts have begun to
determine the proper application of the principles of Rule 26(b)(i), (ii), and (iii)
in opinions like Zubulake, Rowe, and McPeek. See id. at 11.
271. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(iii); see also Withers, supra note 250, at 34
(noting that the proposed amendment to Rule 26(b)(2) would eliminate the
current presumption "that all relevant, accessible and non-privileged
electronically stored information is presumed to be discoverable unless undue
burden is shown and create the new presumption that only accessible data is
discoverable"); Scheindlin, supra note 250, at 32 (noting that the proposed
rules create certain presumptions).
272. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND COMMITFEE NOTES, supra note 15,
at app. 11 (stating that the producing party need not provide data that is not
reasonably accessible and that only upon a motion to compel will the
producing party need to demonstrate to the requesting party and the court that
such electronic information is in fact inaccessible); see also Withers, supra
note 250, at 34 (citing the proposed amendment and explaining that the burden
of making a motion to compel will fall on the requesting party once the
producing party has declared the information inaccessible).
273. See supra notes 265-267 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 265-267 and accompanying text.
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discoverable. 275  The relevance of the inaccessible data is not a
factor.276 To overcome this presumption, the requesting party must
show that there is good cause for compelling the producing party to
supply the inaccessible data.
277
These new presumptions would also shift the burdens of the
litigating parties. Currently, if seeking relief from the court, the
producing party must show that producing the data requested would
constitute an undue burden.2 78 Only then can a producing party be
relieved from the obligation to turn over relevant data. 279 Under the
proposed amendment, the requesting party would have to compel the
producing party to demonstrate that the data are inaccessible.
280
Then the requesting party would be required to show the burden of
producing the inaccessible data would not be undue.
281
While some would argue the proposed amendment rectifies an
injustice against producing parties that, to date, have been burdened
with producing expensive electronic data, others could argue the
proposed amendment creates burdens and presumptions that fly in
the face of the Federal Rules' policy of encouraging liberal and
broad discovery. 282 In particular, the proposed amendment would
275. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND COMMITEE NOTES, supra note 15,
at 10-12; see also Withers, supra note 250, at 38 (explaining that under the
proposed amendment, there is no longer a presumption of discoverability to
overcome).
276. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND COMMITrEE NOTES, supra note 15,
at 11; see also Withers, supra note 250, at 38 (noting that "[t]he amendment
would change the current presumption that all relevant information is
discoverable").
277. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND COMMITTEE NOTES, supra note 15,
at 6; see also Withers, supra note 250, at 38 (explaining that burden of
showing good cause to compel production falls on the requesting party);
Scheindlin, supra note 250, at 32 (noting that the requesting party will only
have to show good cause to compel if the data is deemed inaccessible).
278. E.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Rowe Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West)
296 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001); see
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2); see also Withers, supra note 250, at 38 (explaining
that currently the burden is on the producing party to show an undue burden in
producing data).
279. See sources cited supra note 278.
280. See supra notes 271-272 and accompanying text.
28 1. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
282. See Jones, supra note 10, at 25 (noting e-discovery has become very
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obstruct liberal discovery by allowing the producing party to
withhold relevant information until compelled to produce it. By
changing these burdens and presumptions, the goal of determining
cases on their merits is pushed further out of reach.
c. Potential for abuse
Because producing parties can self-designate their data as
inaccessible, requesting parties may be subjected to
"stonewalling."2 83 For instance, the producing party could claim that
the data are inaccessible, and if the requesting party does not move to
compel, the producing party will have avoided discovery.28 4 If the
requesting party moves to compel, the producing party's claim of
inaccessible data will constitute an effective delaying tactic. 285 That
is, the more time parties spend on a motion to compel, the less time
they spend pursuing litigation. The longer litigation takes, the more
likely one of the parties will run out of resources to fund the suit.
Further, the proposed amendment could encourage companies to
store their data in relatively inaccessible formats.2 86 In essence, the
FRCP would create an escape clause to the discovery rules,287 and
the proposed amendment could bring more disputes to our already
complicated and has overburdened producing parties in large-scale litigation,
sometimes pushing them into settling); Solovy & Byman, supra note 10
(commenting that producing parties have become disadvantaged by e-
discovery costs). But see Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34
(1984); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958)
(noting that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make a civil trial "less a
game of blind man's buff [sic] and more a fair contest with the basic issues and
facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent"); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495, 501 (1947); Robichaud, supra note 201, at 57 (noting that "[tihe
discovery contemplated by the FRCP is liberal and broad").
283. See Rooks, supra note 253, at 22 (arguing that allowing producing
parties to determine what electronic information is not accessible "will invite
more stonewalling than requesting parties already encounter").
284. See id.
285. See id.
286. Some have argued that the Zubulake threshold encourages this as well.
Burke & Siegal, supra note 178, at T6 (speculating that the Zubulake decision
making inaccessible data a pre-requisite for a cost shifting analysis would
encourage corporations to store their data inaccessibly, thus driving up cost
and burdening requesting parties).
287. See Rooks, supra note 253, at 22-23.
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overburdened federal courts.
288
Another possible problem with the proposed amendment to Rule
26(b)(2) is how it will work in tandem with the proposed amendment
to Rule 37(f).289 Rule 37(t) creates a "safe harbor" for parties that
destroy discoverable electronic data if 1) "the party took reasonable
steps to preserve the information after it knew or should have known
the information was discoverable in the action" and 2) the loss of the
information was due to a routine operation of the party's electronic
information system. 29  Thus, courts could only sanction parties for
knowingly and deliberately destroying discoverable information.
291
Parties could reasonably read the proposed amendment to Rule
26(b)(2) and the proposed Rule 37(f) to mean that if a producing
party destroys what it thought were inaccessible data, there will be
no repercussions. Under the proposed amendment to Rule 26(b)(2),
the producing parties are allowed to self-designate data as
inaccessible and that presumption must be overcome by a motion to
compel.2 92 Before the court grants the motion to compel, the
producing party could deliberately and knowingly destroy electronic
data because they are technically not discoverable. 293 In this regard,
the proposed amendments would legalize spoliation of electronic
data.
288. See id.
289. See id. (noting that "[o]perating together, the two proposals would open
a vast area for legalized spoliation. The early, frequent, total, and 'routine'
destruction of data, under a belief-or assertion-that the data did not relate to
a claim or defense.., would be protected from sanctions by the safe-harbor
provision."); see also Withers, supra note 250, at 40 (explaining that
"'inaccessible' data may be routinely destroyed while litigation is pending
without incurring sanctions under Rule 37").
290. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND COMMITTEE NOTES, supra note 15, at
app. 32.
291. See id. at 17; see also supra note 289 and accompanying text
(discussing potential problems created by amendments to Rules 26(b)(2) and
37(0).
292. See supra notes 275-277 and accompanying text.




d. The impact on the current cost shifting analysis
The proposed amendment to Rule 26(b)(2) would largely limit
the applicability of the cost shifting analyses. 294  If courts follow
Zubulake, they will only conduct the analysis in cases where they
find good cause to compel the producing party to turn over
inaccessible data.295  If courts choose to ignore or minimize the
Zubulake threshold, then the cost shifting analysis will be employed
more often. 296 If the standard of undue burden as developed and
articulated in McPeek, Rowe, and Zubulake is upheld by courts,
297
however, there should be fewer opportunities for producing parties to
shift costs to requesting parties, especially when inaccessible data are
deemed not discoverable.
298
The cost shifting analyses are based on Rule 26(b)(2)(iii), the
proportionality test.299 The proposed amendment to Rule 26(b)(2)'s
good-cause analysis will be based in part on the proportionality test
as well.3 °° In fact, the drafters of the proposed amendment intend for
the good cause analysis to resemble the analyses in McPeek, Rowe,
and Zubulake.3° '
Courts determining whether the requesting party has shown
good-cause to compel the producing party to turn over inaccessible
data will use the same factors and reasoning to determine whether
costs should be shifted from the producing party to the requesting
294. The most widely followed cost shifting analysis is that of Zubulake.
See supra note 145 and accompanying text. Zubulake establishes a threshold,
indicating that if data is accessible, courts should not consider cost shifting.
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
295. Only in cases where the data is inaccessible does the Zubulake test
apply. 217 F.R.D. at 323.
296. If courts read Zubulake as a guideline, rather than a mandate for cost
shifting, then the threshold will not bar courts from shifting production costs.
See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
297. See infra Part IV.B.2.
298. Reasonably accessible data is not as expensive and thus not as
burdensome to produce as inaccessible data. See Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 323
(discussing the types of data that were accessible and inaccessible).
299. See infra Part IV.B.1.
300. See supra notes 268-270 and accompanying text.
301. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND COMMITTEE NOTES, supra note 15,
at app. 14. The committee notes recognize that courts have begun to determine
the proper application of the principles of Rule 26(b)(i), (ii), and (iii) in
opinions like Zubulake, Rowe, and McPeek. See id. at 11.
Summer 2005] 1679
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA W REVIEW [Vol. 38:1639
party due to undue burden.
30 2
While the proposed amendment does not expressly challenge or
attempt to change the Fpresumption that the producing party pays its
own production costs, 3° 3 it may have an effect on that concept. The
new presumption that inaccessible data are not discoverable may
sway courts in their determination of what constitutes an undue
burden for the producing party. It is foreseeable that a court would
be more likely to find an "undue burden" where a party must produce
data that the FRCP have determined is not discoverable.
The proposed amendment does not directly address cost
shifting, 30 4 but it seeks to correct the same perceived wrongs that cost
shifting was intended to address. 30 5 The burden and expense of
producing large amounts of electronic data was dissipated by cost
shifting, and it would be greatly reduced by the proposed
amendment.30 6 Yet both cost shifting and the proposed amendment
seem to be in direct conflict with the policy of liberal and broad
discovery that has been the foundation of civil jurisprudence. Both
cost shifting and the proposed amendment raise obstacles to
disinterring the truth and make it difficult for matters to be settled on
their merits.
E. Conclusion: The Swinging Pendulum of
E-Discovery and Cost Shifting
It is surprising that an area of the law as new as cost shifting in
e-discovery has been subject to a swinging pendulum, but it has.
Once the Supreme Court determined electronic data were
discoverable, the courts required producing parties to produce
electronic data with little mention of the burden on those producing
302. See id. at app. 14; see also supra notes 268-270 and accompanying
text.
303. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND COMMITTEE NOTES, supra note 15,
at app. 14 (making no mention of cost shifting).
304. See id.
305. Courts use cost shifting to alleviate the undue burden of producing
electronic data. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text. The proposed
amendments also note that "[tihe good cause analysis balances the requesting
party's need for the information against the burden on the responding party."
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND COMMITTEE NOTES, supra note 15, at 11.
306. See sources cited supra note 305.
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parties. 30 7 With McPeek and Rowe, the pendulum began to swing in
favor of producing parties, with courts more sympathetic to their
plight allowing production costs to shift to requesting parties.30 8
That swing was short-lived, however. Zubulake pared back the
effect of Rowe and McPeek by attempting to preserve the
presumption that the producing party bears the costs of production.
30 9
By preserving that presumption, the Zubulake court was trying to
adhere to the FRCP's policy of liberal and broad discovery.
Currently, the proposed amendments swing in favor of producing
parties by significantly limiting the electronic data that are presumed
discoverable.310 In late 2005 we will see where the cost shifting
pendulum lands, at least for the time being.
307. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 357 (1978)
(holding that party responding to the discovery must pay costs of production);
Daewoo Elecs. Co., v. United States, 650 F. Supp. 1003, 1006 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1986) (holding that where producing party benefited from technology, party
will bear the burden of producing e-discovery); see also Mackey v. IBP, Inc.,
167 F.R.D. 186, 199 (D. Kan. 1996) (holding that "[i]n most instances,
[producing discovery] will entail some burden" and requiring the producing
party to bear the costs of e-discovery production); Haworth, Inc. v. Herman
Miller, Inc., No. 1:92 CV 877, 1995 WL 465838, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 20,
1995) (noting that the costs and burden involved in producing e-discovery was
miniscule in comparison to the amount in controversy and holding that the
discovery producer should bear the costs of production); Bills v. Kennecott
Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 460, 464 (D. Utah 1985) (holding that because the
amount of money involved in the discovery production is not excessive and the
burden in obtaining the data would be greater for the requesting party, the costs
should not be shifted to the requesting party).
308. See infra Part IV.B.2.a-b.
309. See infra Part IV.B.2.c.
310. See infra Part IV.D.
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